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ABSTRACT 
The Niger-Delta is the oil- and gas-rich region of Nigeria, which has 
been described as an epitome of the resource curse—poverty, squalor, 
illiteracy, and environmental degradation exist adjacent to the 
unspeakable wealth taken from the region. 
However, a judicial approach to addressing the environmental 
degradation in the region has not yielded the desired result because, 
among other reasons, Nigerian law places the burden of proof in 
environmental litigation on the plaintiff. The plaintiff has to show on a 
balance of probabilities that the defendant’s action or omission was 
the cause of the environmental harm that resulted in injury to either the 
plaintiff or the plaintiff’s interest. With pervasive poverty in the Niger-
Delta, discharging the burden of proof becomes a herculean task. 
Using the United Nations Environment Program’s (UNEP) 
Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland (the UNEP Report) as the 
focus and Ogoniland in the Niger-Delta as the locus, the findings of 
this Article can be extrapolated across the Niger-Delta because 
Ogoniland is a representative of all the environmental conditions of  
the Niger Delta. The Article argues that the peculiar nature of 
environmental litigation places insurmountable hurdles in the path of 
the plaintiffs. This includes the high cost of gathering evidence and the 
largely technical and scientific nature of the evidence, which is 
sometimes not only exclusively within the knowledge of the defendants 
but also in their custody. Add to this the difficulty of proving causation, 
and the task of environmental litigants in the Niger-Delta region of 
Nigeria is almost an impossible task. 
This Article also discusses an emerging trend in other jurisdictions 
where the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, bears the burden of proof 
in environmental litigation. It argues that Nigeria should amend its law 
of evidence to reverse the burden of proof so that this aspect of 
Nigerian law can align with the laws in those jurisdictions and with a 
global pattern of practice. 
This Article further argues that, from an equitable point of view, the 
imperative of reversing the burden of proof duty is underscored by the 
fact that the potential defendants, including the International Oil 
Corporations, sometimes deliberately and willfully degrade the 
environment. It will, therefore, serve the end of justice if the defendants 
were to bear the burden of proof. 
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INTRODUCTION 
n Nigeria, the rules governing the burden of proof in civil 
proceedings, which is the type of litigation that most 
environmental litigation is brought as, is well settled. The burden of 
proof is on the plaintiff.1 It may have been desirable to place the burden 
of proof on the plaintiff in other strands of civil litigation, but 
considering the peculiar intricacies of environmental litigation, the 
burden of proof becomes onerous and almost an impossible task for the 
plaintiff to discharge. This becomes especially true for plaintiffs who 
would most benefit from initiating environmental litigation. This is 
because those who bear the brunt of environmental degradation are the 
illiterate, the poor, and the most vulnerable segments of any given 
community.2 Moreover, considering the cost of gathering pieces of 
evidence to successfully prosecute environmental litigation, the 
chances of plaintiffs being able to overcome the burden of proof are 
slim. Lastly, because the evidence that needs to be adduced to succeed 
in environmental litigation is mostly scientific in nature, would-be 
litigants face additional hurdles. 
Furthermore, the key players in the Nigerian extractive industry are 
not only culpable but also complicit in the sustainability crises in the 
Niger Delta.3 The International Oil Corporations and their government 
allies transact business electronically and are often in custody of key 
documents, whose existence and/or content are sometimes unknown to 
the plaintiffs.4 Add to this the difficulty in accessing and obtaining this 
evidence, which may be undisclosed by the defendants, and the 
frustrations the plaintiffs face become immediately obvious. Lastly, the 
trend in most countries in environmental litigation is to shift the burden 
to the defendants, and Nigeria needs to align its law with the current 
trend.5 
 
1 Evidence Act (2011), § 131(2) (Nigeria), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54f86b844. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/2XUZ-KCGK]. 
2 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Human Rights, Environmental Justice, and the North-South 
Divide, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 449, 449–
50 (Anna Grear & Louis J. Kotzé eds., 2015). 
3 Joseph C. Ebegbulem, Dickson Ekpe & Theophilus O. Adejumo, Oil Exploration and 
Poverty in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Critical Analysis, 4 INT’L J. BUS. & SOCIAL 
SCI. 279, 282 (2013). 
4 See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF OGONILAND 38 
(2011) [hereinafter UNEP REPORT]. 
5 See Robert Costanza et al., Principles for Sustainable Governance of the Oceans, 281 
SCI. 198 (1998). 
I 
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In this Article, I will advocate for shifting the burden of proof to the 
defendant. Using the UNEP Report as the focus, I will highlight the 
environmental challenges that typically confront the Niger-Delta 
people. Then I will demonstrate why, for the sake of justice, there is a 
need to shift the burden of proof in environmental litigation in Nigeria. 
This Article will employ the doctrinal research methodology. This 
methodology is used when carrying out “a distinctly legal approach to 
research,”6 like in the case at hand, because it will permit the 
identification, analysis, and transplantation of legal concepts and laws.7 
This methodology is particularly useful when the focus of the research 
is the evaluation of legal instruments and court cases.8 
I 
THE OGONI STRUGGLE 
The Niger-Delta area of Nigeria, which is the only hub for oil- and 
gas-related activities in Nigeria, is made up of many ethnic 
nationalities, of which the Ogonis are one.9 The Ogonis, occupying the 
eastern flank of the Niger-Delta, can be found in the Eleme, Gokana, 
Khana, and Tai Local Government Areas of Rivers State, covering 
about 404 square miles.10 The Ogonis are bordered by the Ibibio and 
Anang in the east, the Andoni, Nkoro, and Opobo in the south, and the 
Ikwerre in the north.11 The official figures of the last census, conducted 
in Nigeria in 2006, put the population of Ogonis at 832,000.12 
Perhaps what has brought Ogoniland to both national and 
international consciousness is its oil and gas resources, which have 
been more of a curse than a blessing. UNEP sums it up thus: 
The history of oil exploration and production in Ogoniland is a long, 
complex and often painful one that to date has become seemingly  
 
 
6 Terry Hutchinson, Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury, in RESEARCH METHODS 
IN LAW 8, 8 (Dawn Watkins & Mandy Burtons eds., 2d ed. 2018). 
7 Id. at 13. 
8 Mark Van Hoecke, Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?,  
in METHODOLOGIES OF LEGAL RESEARCH: WHAT KIND OF METHOD FOR WHAT KIND OF 
DISCIPLINE? 2, 11 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2011), https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/ 
book/methodologies-of-legal-research-what-kind-of-method-for-what-kind-of-discipline/ 
ch1-legal-doctrine-which-method-s-for-what-kind-of-discipline [https://perma.cc/ED3P-
MFEE]. 
9 IkpoBari Dumletam Senewo, The Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR): Extent of Actualization 
25 Years Later?, 2 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES & SOC’Y 664, 665 (2015). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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intractable in terms of its resolution and future direction. It is also a 
history that has put people and politics and the oil industry at 
loggerheads rendering a landscape characterized by a lack of trust, 
paralysis and blame, set against a worsening situation for the 
communities concerned.13 
Like every other Niger-Delta community, the Ogoni may have 
heaved a sigh of relief when oil was first discovered in Bomu in 1958,14 
due to the prospect of socioeconomic prosperity that often follow such 
endeavors. However, when at least 634 million barrels of oil valued at 
$100 billion were extracted from Ogoniland “with nothing in return 
except suffering, poverty, sickness, death, and the devastation and 
degradation of the Ogoni environment,” the sigh became one of 
agony.15 
Despite the windfall from oil, UNEP notes that Ogoniland remains 
a “tragic history of pollution from oil spills and oil well fires.”16 In 2008 
and 2009, two major spills occurred that destroyed the entire Bodo 
Creek.17 Apart from oil spills and oil well fires, Ogoniland bears the 
additional burden of playing host to oil infrastructure with attendant 
environmental implications. As of 1993, Shell’s twelve oil fields, five 
flow stations with 185,000 barrels per day (b/d) capacity, and a 
120,000–150,000 b/d Trans-Niger pipeline were all in Ogoniland, and 
these facilities have become channels of environmental degradation.18 
The Ogonis responded to the dashed expectations and negative 
outcomes in the 1990s by forming the now-famous Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) under the leadership of Dr. 
Garrick Leton, with the late Ken Saro-Wiwa—the man who later 
became synonymous with the movement—serving as spokesperson.19 
MOSOP was conceived as a nonpolitical mass movement.20 It started 
with the submission of the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) to both the 
federal government of Nigeria and Shell in 1990.21 The OBR “made 
great impact on the socio-political, environmental, and human rights 
 
13 UNEP REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
14 Tijen Demirel-Pegg & Scott Pegg, Razed, Repressed and Bought Off: The 
Demobilization of the Ogoni Protest Campaign in the Niger Delta, 2 EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES & SOC’Y 654, 657 (2015). 
15 Senewo, supra note 9, at 665. 
16 UNEP REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. 
17 Demirel-Pegg & Pegg, supra note 14, at 657. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Senewo, supra note 9, at 664. 
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consciousness of the Nigerian state and Shell.”22 But in an apathy that 
exposes the complicity of both the federal government of Nigeria and 
Shell in contributing to the environmental degradation in Ogoniland, 
neither the federal government nor Shell responded to the demands 
made by the OBR.23 Rather than deterring MOSOP, the movement was 
galvanized into further action and created an addendum to the original 
OBR, which was presented to the international community in 1991.24 
In 1993, because of the continued hostility between Shell and 
Ogoniland, Shell moved out of Ogoniland and has yet to return at the 
time of this writing.25 
The federal government of Nigeria responded to MOSOP’s 
emergence and activities in a brutal fashion. Its crackdown on 
Ogoniland culminated in the unjust hanging of Saro-Wiwa and eight 
others in 1995 after a court found them guilty of murder.26 John Major, 
a former U.K. Prime Minister, describes Saro-Wiwa’s death as 
“judicial murder,” as he was a target of the Nigerian government before 
his eventual execution.27 Prior to Saro-Wiwa’s execution by the 
Nigerian government, he was incarcerated four times between April 
and July of 1993 and had been banned from traveling either abroad or 
within Nigeria.28 The government’s complicity in his death could be 
seen in the fact that he was arrested in May 1994 for the murder of four 
Ogoni chiefs at a gathering in Gokana—a gathering which Nigeria’s 
government had prevented Saro-Wiwa from attending. He was 
arraigned before a special military tribunal that was established with 
the sole purpose of trying him and other accomplices for incitement of 
the murders. They were found guilty of murder and sentenced to death 
by hanging by the tribunal “whose procedures blatantly violated 
international standards of due process.”29 
During this period, “Ogoni became a militarized zone. Incessant 
military crackdowns and ‘wasting operations’ were conducted in all 
 
22 Id. 
23 Rhuks Ako, A Lega(l)cy Unfulfilled: Reflections of the Wiwa-Led MOSOP and the 
Localisation of Human Rights, 2 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES & SOC’Y 625, 628 (2015). 
24 Senewo, supra note 9, at 666. 
25 See Victor Adefemi Isumonah, Minority Political Mobilization in the Struggle for 
Resource Control in Nigeria, 2 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES & SOC’Y 645, 645 (2015). 
26 Senewo, supra note 9, at 666. 
27 Demirel-Pegg & Pegg, supra note 14, at 660. 
28 Id. at 659. 
29 Id. at 660 (quoting BROWNWEN MANBY, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING 
COMMUNITIES 125 (1999)). 
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Ogoni towns and villages . . . . These resulted in internal and external 
refugee situations, destruction of properties, looting, and deaths.”30 
A. The Ogoni Report 
At the turn of the millennium, which coincided with the return to 
civilian rule in Nigeria, the federal government, led by the then 
President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, showed keen interest in resolving 
the Ogoni imbroglio. Concerned about the environmental degradation 
due to the extraction of oil and gas, President Chief Obasanjo invited 
UNEP to carry out an assessment of the environmental degradation in 
Ogoniland as a first step in improving the environmental situation.31 
UNEP swung into action and conducted fourteen months of 
painstaking investigation, which culminated in the presentation of its 
report upon which this Article is partly predicated.32 
In the course of its work, UNEP studied 200 locations and conducted 
soil contamination analysis in 69 of those sites.33 Water analyses were 
conducted from 142 groundwater wells to determine the level of 
contamination.34 Studies were also conducted for the same purpose 
from soil extracted from 780 boreholes.35 To ascertain the health 
impact of oil and gas activities on the Ogoni people, UNEP reviewed 
5000 medical records and examined 122 km of pipeline in conjunction 
with holding discussions with about 23,000 people.36 In the ensuing 
subsection, I will undertake a sectorial analysis of UNEP’s finding, but 
generally, UNEP confirmed that the Ogoniland environment has been 
seriously degraded and that this has adversely affected the health of the 
people. To underscore the extent of the degradation, UNEP concluded 
that it may take between twenty-five to thirty years for a complete 
remediation of the environmental degradation in Ogoniland.37 
 
30 Senewo, supra note 9, at 666. 
31 UNEP REPORT, supra note 4, at 26. 
32 Id. at 6. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 12. 
ODONG (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/20  6:17 PM 
200 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 35, 193 
B. The UNEP Report’s Specific Findings 
After its completion of the Ogoniland Assessment, UNEP submitted 
its report to then President Goodluck Jonathan in August 2011.38  
The UNEP Report was later published in the same year by UNEP and 
made available to the public.39 UNEP found extensive pollution by 
petroleum hydrocarbons in the land areas, sediments, and swamplands 
of Ogoniland,40 as well as highly degraded wetlands at risk of 
disintegration.41 It concluded that the “Ogoni people live with this 
[incessant] pollution [constantly]. Since average life expectancy  
in Nigeria is less than 50 years . . . most members of the current 
Ogoniland community have lived with chronic oil pollution throughout 
their lives.”42 Based on the gravity of the situation, UNEP 
recommended the immediate cleanup of the Ogoniland, which was 
estimated to take twenty-five to thirty years to complete.43 It also 
recommended the creation of a special agency—the Ogoniland 
Environmental Restoration Authority—to oversee the cleanup at a cost 
of $1 billion,44 making it the world’s largest cleanup.45 The report 
generated interest around the world, with people contacting UNEP to 
offer support for the Ogoni people and providing useful views on a way 
forward.46 
On water contamination, UNEP found “in a significant number of 
locations, serious threats to human health from contaminated drinking 
water . . . .”47 It also found “that pollution has perhaps gone further and  
 
 
38 UNEP in Ogoniland Newsletter, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME Sept. 2011, at 1, 
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/25229/UNEP_Ogoniland_ 
newsletter_Sep2011.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/DLS8-ZSVZ] 
[hereinafter UNEP Newsletter]. 
39 John Vidal, UN Report on the Ogoniland Oil Spills Could Be Catalyst for Change, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2011, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 
poverty-matters/2011/aug/10/un-nigeria-ogoniland-oil-spills [https://perma.cc/LND9-
YQ3Z]. 
40 UNEP REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. 
41 Id. at 10. 
42 Id. at 204. 
43 Id. at 12. 
44 Id. at 15. 
45 Camillus Eboh & Felix Onuah, U.N. Slams Shell as Nigeria Needs Biggest Ever Oil 
Clean-Up, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2011, 8:49 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-
ogoniland/u-n-slams-shell-as-nigeria-needs-biggest-ever-oil-clean-up-idUSTRE7734MQ 
20110804 [https://perma.cc/C5QB-5C3Q]. 
46 UNEP Newsletter, supra note 38, at 1. 
47 UNEP REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
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penetrated deeper than many may have previously supposed.”48 UNEP 
also found hydrocarbons in surface water throughout the creeks.49 In 
the Nisisioken Ogale community in Ogoniland, for instance, it was 
discovered that benzene, which is highly carcinogenic, contaminated 
the drinking water source at levels more than 900 times the World 
Health Organization (WHO) benchmark.50 In other places, water from 
communities adjacent to contaminated sites was contaminated with 
hydrocarbons, sometimes exceeding 1000 times the Nigerian standard 
of 3 μg/L.51 
The report also found soil contamination that exceeds Nigerian 
national standards in land sites close to oil facilities.52 In fact, at forty-
one different locations the analyses revealed that pollution from 
hydrocarbons had seeped down and penetrated the groundwater where 
it accumulated at levels above the Nigerian standard.53 
Regarding vegetation, the report notes that oil spills on land often 
led to fires that devastated vegetation and left a hard layer of debris 
covering the surface of the land.54 UNEP added that when remediation 
is difficult or done haphazardly, the land surface becomes a breeding 
ground for alien and invasive species, like the nipa palm, that are 
resistant to hydrocarbons and further destabilize the ecosystem.55 
UNEP noted that oil pollution left mangroves stripped of leaves and 
stems and left coats of a bitumen-like substance that was sometimes 
thicker than one centimeter on roots.56 And because mangroves are 
spawning areas and nurseries for fish, the life cycles of these species 
were significantly adversely affected by the extensive pollution of these 
areas.57 
With agriculture as the mainstay of the Niger-Delta people,58 the 
unfortunate situation in which the Ogoni people have found themselves 
 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 10. 
50 Id. at 11. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 9. 
53 Id. at 10. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 NIGER-DELTA REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN, NIGER DELTA DEV. 
COMMISSION 48, 68, https://www.nddc.gov.ng/NDRMP%20Chapter%201.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/PPC7-ZBBL] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
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is alarming because the degradation limits their sources of life and 
livelihood. For instance, regarding the fishery-agro business, the report 
notes that the sector is suffering as a result of the contamination of the 
creeks and the destruction of fish habitat because of a ubiquitous coat 
of floating oil.59 This means ruined businesses for fish farmers who had 
set up businesses in or near the creeks.60 
On air pollution, the report notes that benzene was identified in all 
atmospheric samples “at concentrations ranging from 0.155 to 48.2 
μg/m3. Approximately 10 per cent [sic] of detected benzene 
concentrations in Ogoniland were higher than the concentrations WHO 
and the United States Environmental Protection Agency report as 
corresponding to 1 in 10,000 cancer risk.”61 UNEP further observed 
that the exposure to hydrocarbons in air and water was above the 
normal concentration.62 
In conclusion, large swaths of resources in the region have been 
devastated by oil extraction. Despite these findings, UNEP advises that 
the report should be taken as a baseline, as fourteen months was not 
enough time to do a more thorough assessment, suggesting that the 
situation on the ground may well be worse than reported.63 UNEP 
concludes that it will take between twenty-five and thirty years for a 
complete remediation of Ogoniland.64 As grim as the situation is in 
Ogoniland, a judicial approach by way of environmental litigation is 
not likely to be successful because of the placement of the burden of 
proof on the plaintiffs. Taiwo Osipitan highlighted this issue of 
Nigerian law when he stated that a “striking problem of environmental 
litigation is the operation of the rules of Burden of proof.”65 In Part II, 
I will examine the state of Nigerian law regarding the burden of proof 
and why it is a difficult standard for plaintiffs to meet. 
 
59 UNEP REPORT, supra note 4, at 10. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 11. 
62 Id. at 10. 
63 See id. at 8. 
64 Id. at 12. 
65 Taiwo Osipitan, Problems of Proof in Environmental Litigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAWS IN NIGERIA INCLUDING COMPENSATION 112, 113 (J.A. Omotola ed., 1990). 
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II 
THE LAW IN NIGERIA REGARDING BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
Nigerian law has specific provisions about evidentiary and 
persuasive burdens of proof. Although Nigeria runs a federal system of 
government,66 Item 23 of the Exclusive Legislative List in the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria places evidence within the purview of the 
federal government.67 The federal government, by virtue of this, 
enacted the Evidence Act in 1945,68 which was premised “on the 
Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence and on the common law of 
England as it was in 1943.”69 Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act places 
the burden of proof in civil matters on the plaintiffs.70 
However, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission (Commission)—
an agency of the federal government saddled with the responsibility of 
reviewing Nigeria’s substantive and procedural laws to meet the 
exigencies of the moment71—has expressed its dissatisfaction with the 
continued use of this piece of legislation, which they termed 
“outdated.”72 In the Commission’s submission to The Report of the 
Reform of the Evidence Act, the Commission noted that in modern 
times, with reliance on electronic modes of communication, 
transactions, and correspondence, and on computer-generated 
evidence, it was imperative that legislation reflected these 
technological changes.73 The Commission went further and made 
recommendations on areas that required amendments, such as the 
balance and burden of proof.74 The recommendations regarding the 
burden and standard of proof were particularly profound. 
The Evidence Act was eventually amended in 2011, but the section 
on burden of proof remained as it was in 1945.75 With the courts 
 
66 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 2(2). 
67 Id. at Third Schedule, Part I, Item 23. 
68 See A.E.W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW 88 (1963). 
69 Nazeem Goolam, Reforming the Law of Evidence in Nigeria, 44 J. AFR. L. 128, 128 
(2000). 
70 Evidence Act (2011), § 131(1) (Nigeria). 
71 See generally Law Reform, NIGERIAN L. REFORM COMMISSION, http://www. 
nlrc.com.ng/category.php?category_id=54 [https://perma.cc/YVH6-RDEQ] (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2020). 
72 Goolam, supra note 69, at 129. 
73 See id. at 128. 
74 Id. at 128–29. 
75 Evidence Act (2011), §§ 131, 133; cf. Evidence Act (1945), § 5 (Nigeria). 
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hamstrung by an obsolete provision on an all-important aspect of the 
law of evidence, plaintiffs are naturally disadvantaged in discharging 
the burden of proof.76 In the Nigerian case of Ogiale v. Shell,77 the 
Court of Appeal, per Nsofor, J.C.A., reaffirmed the position of the law 
in regard to the person who bears the burden of proof in environmental 
litigation by stating that “he who asserts ought to prove his assertion 
and this by credible evidence,”78 and “the claimant ought to prove his 
case relying on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the 
defendant’s case.”79 For reasons stated earlier, I argue that this is a real 
burden on the plaintiffs in environmental litigation. 
III 
THE NEED TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LITIGATION IN NIGERIA 
Indeed, and as observed by UNEP, the “oil industry has been a key 
sector of the Nigerian economy for over 50 years. But many Nigerians 
have paid a high price.”80 I argue that the high price includes the weight 
of the burden of proof in environmental litigation that is placed on the 
plaintiffs. 
There are several reasons that make this particular burden of proof 
especially onerous for the prospective plaintiff. First is the prevalence 
of poverty. The World Bank asserts that twelve percent of the world’s 
extremely poor are Nigerians (people surviving on less than $1.90 USD 
a day).81 The cost of gathering evidence to successfully prosecute 
environmental litigation is huge and well beyond the reach of these 
ordinary people.82 Second, the difficulty of obtaining evidence needed 
to persuade the court to give judgment in favor of the plaintiff in 
environmental litigation—evidence that is sometimes within the 
custody of the defendant—exerts undue financial pressure on the 
plaintiffs. Third, there is an additional burden thrust on the plaintiff to 
prove causation (that the degradable act of the defendant resulted in 
 
76 Osipitan, supra note 65, at 114. 
77 Jedrzej George Frynas, Legal Change in Africa: Evidence from Oil-Related Litigation 
in Nigeria, 43 J. AFR. L. 121, 130 (1999) (citing Ogiale v. Shell [1997] 1 NWLR 148, 180 
(Nigeria)). 
78 Id. at 130. 
79 Id. at 131. 
80 UNEP REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. 
81 Roy Katayama & Divyanshi Wadhwa, Half of the World’s Poor Live in Just 5 
Countries, WORLD BANK BLOGS: DATA BLOG (Jan. 9, 2019), https://blogs.worldbank.org/ 
opendata/half-world-s-poor-live-just-5-countries [https://perma.cc/M6DG-8J3J]. 
82 See Osipitan, supra note 65, at 116. 
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environmental damage and the subsequent injury sustained by the 
plaintiff). With a lack of scientific consensus on causation, the plaintiff 
has an uphill task. Lastly, the need for Nigeria to harmonize its rules of 
evidence in line with the global trend of shifting the burden of proof 
from the plaintiffs to the defendants makes it imperative for Nigeria to 
amend its law in this regard. In the ensuing subsections, I will consider 
each of these challenges in more detail. 
A. The Cost of Gathering Evidence 
The cost of gathering evidence in environmental litigation is huge, 
and the high level of poverty not just in Ogoniland but in the entire 
Niger-Delta means that plaintiffs are constrained by a paucity of funds. 
This affects their ability to gather the evidence needed to successfully 
overcome the burden of proof in environmental litigation. Upon 
realizing this, UNEP made it clear that “key actors” should bear  
the cost of its assessment of Ogoniland.83 This speaks volumes to the 
nexus between funds availability and quality evidence gathering. 
Considering the nature of environmental litigation, a scientific 
approach to gathering evidence is a must. For instance, with respect to 
contamination from hydrocarbons, UNEP opines that “the average 
human being would probably not notice the contamination in the top 1 
metre of soil around the B600 sampling location.”84 This creates the 
need for scientific analyses with expertise and equipment not available 
to the layman and at costs that are prohibitive to the impoverished 
Niger-Delta people. 
Apart from the cost implication, the length of the evidence-gathering 
period is another factor that might work against plaintiffs. UNEP 
Assessment of Ogoniland spanned a period of fourteen months.85 It is 
doubtful if there are persons or even communities in the Niger-Delta 
with the financial resources to sustain a similar operation. Yet UNEP 
deemed its report a baseline!86 This indicates that the situation could 
actually be much worse than what was captured in the report, with the 
high likelihood of degenerating over time. Furthermore, the cost to 
gather evidence in terms of human and technological resources is 
beyond the reach of an average plaintiff. As revealed by the report, 
UNEP examined 200 sites, reviewed 122 kms of pipeline rights of way, 
 
83 UNEP REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. 
84 Id. at 121. 
85 Id. at 6. 
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examined more than 5000 medical records, engaged over 23,000 
people at community meetings, conducted 69 soil contaminations, 
analyzed 142 groundwater wells, and collected and analyzed soil 
extractions from 780 wells in the course of its assessment of 
Ogoniland.87 In the area of expertise, it is doubtful if any community, 
let alone any one person, can afford to engage in anything near the level 
of expertise deployed by UNEP in Ogoniland. UNEP had to recruit a 
team of international experts in various disciplines including 
contaminated land, water, forestry, and public health. The team 
included senior UNEP managers, local experts, academics, and support 
teams for logistics, community liaison, and security. 
As for facilities, it is unlikely that any plaintiff can afford to mobilize 
the resources that UNEP was able to deploy in Ogoniland in order to 
obtain evidence that can stand the crucible of an environmental 
litigation trial. For instance, to guarantee the quality of the test result,88 
all the samples collected by UNEP were not only collected in 
compliance with international best practices but they were also sent for 
analysis in accredited and certified ISO 17025 laboratories.89 The 
laboratories used were Al Control Geochem, United Kingdom; ALS 
Scandinavia AG, Sweden; and Spiez Laboratory, Switzerland.90 In 
addition, UNEP employed remote sensing extensively in its analyses, 
and it also made use of available cutting-edge rehabilitation mediation 
techniques.91 None of these evidence-gathering methods, including the 
cost of the specialized transportation of samples, are within the reach 
of an average plaintiff. 
UNEP carried out its work in four areas: land, water, vegetation, and 
public health, with separate teams of both international and local 
experts.92 Again, it is doubtful that a single plaintiff or group of 
plaintiffs could afford this. For example, experts from the World 
Maritime University in Sweden headed the aquatic team, while an 
international expert from Bern University in Switzerland headed the 
vegetation team,93 and an international expert from Boston University 
headed the public health team.94 By far, the most problematic area for 
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UNEP was land assessment because UNEP had to engage the largest 
contingent of international experts for that team.95 
Apart from expertise, UNEP also had cutting-edge equipment at its 
disposal, which may not be within the reach of the poor litigants in the 
Niger-Delta. For instance, to determine the level of contamination of 
fish and shellfish by polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and chlorinated 
pesticides, UNEP could afford to use “a process of chemical extraction, 
evaporation and measurement through gas chromatograph equipped 
[sic] with a mass spectroscopy (GC-MS).”96 To analyze hydrocarbons, 
first UNEP had to solvent-extract a sample and thereafter use a gas 
chromatograph-flame ionization detector (GC-FID) to analyze it.97 To 
determine metallic contents in the sample, a “high-resolution 
inductively coupled plasma mass spectroscopy (ICP-MS)” was used 
for the analysis.98 On air analysis, UNEP took the unusual step to 
examine particular volatile organic compounds (VOCs) “rather than 
total VOCs because the toxicity of total VOCs depends on the 
composition of the mixture.”99 However, this further put a strain on 
UNEP’s resources as “22 VOC samples from oil spill areas, 20 VOC 
samples from nearby communities, 2 VOC samples from reference 
locations and 23 respirable particulate samples from oil spill areas and 
nearby communities”100 had to be collected and analyzed via U.S. EPA 
Method TO-17,101 “which involves sampling with thermal desorption 
tubes and laboratory analysis with gas chromatography/mass 
spectroscopy.”102 
The UNEP used existing satellites to capture imagery for navigation 
purposes, scouting exercises, land mapping, change detection, and to 
make note of oil spills.103 Apart from the satellites, GIS mapping 
technique and cartography were extensively used to generate about 200 
maps.104 Through these processes, cartographic atlases were produced 
and constantly updated.105 The use of GPS proved very handy as GPS-
 
95 See id. at 54. 
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fitted cameras were used to take well over 10,000 geo-indexed pictures. 
These pictures became very useful during scouting and reconnaissance 
missions, whether on land, water, or air, to geo-trace the information 
photographed in the field.106 GPS-fitted laptops were also on hand and 
served three important purposes—the verification of spills reported by 
Shell, the documentation of spills reported by the communities, and the 
documentation of spills discovered by UNEP.107 
To determine natural radioactivity in samples, radionuclide 
concentration of samples have to be known, and to unearth this, UNEP 
employed high-purity Germanium (HPGe) CANBERRA detectors.108 
Also, to find out “the existence of medium and long-living 
radioisotopes” and nonradioactive materials, UNEP used a Finnigan 
Element XR high-resolution (sector field) mass spectrometer, which 
subjected samples to an inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry 
(ICP-MS).109 
Lastly, to determine and monitor pH levels, temperature, and the 
level of conductivity, UNEP used a Hatch Multimeter.110 To monitor 
and measure air temperature, humidity, and fractions of particles in 
air—including inhalable fraction (PM10), respiratory fraction (PM2.5), 
and ultrafine fraction (PM1) up to less than one micron—UNEP used a 
portable Thermo Scientific Particulate Monitor DataRAM 4.111 To 
identify naturally occurring radioactive materials, UNEP used 
Automess 6150 AD 6/H calibrated dose-rate meter equipment 
alongside an Automess alpha-beta-gamma probe 6150 AD-17.112 
However, despite the resources at UNEP’s disposal, UNEP 
encountered logistical challenges.113 This highlights the fate that awaits 
the poor and illiterate population of the Niger-Delta who are being 
assaulted daily with environmental degradation challenges. One of the 
problems that confronted UNEP was a lack of data to work with.114 
When data existed at all, the information was grossly outdated; for 
instance, the only images of Ogoniland on the Landsat archive were 
from 1976, while the most recent image from Advanced Spaceborne 
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Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer dates back to 2007. Even 
the most recent image was considered old for a project carried out in 
2011, as further research revealed major changes in the mangroves 
adjoining Ogoniland since January 2009.115 Apart from this, UNEP was 
hamstrung by a scarcity of resources; for instance, to overcome the lack 
of recent images of Ogoniland, UNEP decided to develop images of its 
own through the deployment of satellite technology, but that effort was 
deterred by the cost. Consequently, only a part of Ogoniland was 
ultimately pictured.116 UNEP, perhaps with a tinge of exhaustion 
despite the resources at its disposal, confessed that “the two year study 
of the environmental and public health impacts of oil contamination in 
Ogoniland is one of the most complex on the ground assessments ever 
undertaken by UNEP.”117 
From the above, it can be deduced that because of the resources 
needed to gather credible evidence to successfully prosecute an 
environmental litigation suit, the poor plaintiffs in Ogoniland and, by 
extension, the Niger-Delta, will always come short of meeting their 
burden of proof. To mitigate these challenges, the burden of proof 
should shift from the plaintiffs to the defendants. If the burden shifted, 
the defendants would not be limited by a lack of financial resources, a 
lack of information, a lack of expertise needed to gather evidence, or 
even the obscurity of relevant evidence. This is in line with Camporesi 
and Knuckles’s argument that in the industrial sector “where the very 
activities that drive profit can cause environmental harm, only the 
private sector has the capacity, information, and resources necessary to 
conduct adequate testing required to prove that their actions are not 
causing environmental damage.”118 
In Ogiale v. Shell,119 where the plaintiffs instituted an environmental 
litigation suit against Shell, the plaintiffs lost because they could not 
hire an expert witness in the area of heat and radiation despite calling a 
soil scientist and an agronomist as witnesses.120 Commenting on the 
Nigerian situation, Kayode Oyende opines that “evidence of experts is 
 
115 Id. at 80. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 8. 
118 Silvia Camporesi & James A. Knuckles, Shifting the Burden of Proof in Doping: 
Lessons from Environmental Sustainability Applied to High-Performance Sport,  
15 REFLECTIVE PRAC. 106, 111 (2014). 
119 Frynas, supra note 77, at 130 (discussing Ogiale v. Shell [1997] 1 NWLR 148 
(Nigeria)). 
120 Id. at 131. 
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not easy to come by and they are certainly not the prerogatives of rural 
farmers and villagers.”121 Frynas further argues that what typically 
confronts plaintiffs is the lack of finances to fund the scientific tests  
to determine the adverse impact of oil operations; such tests require 
considerable financial resources.122 And as shown in the UNEP Report, 
high-level expertise and facilities are needed to gather evidence 
necessary to successfully prosecute claims in environmental 
litigation.123 For example, because UNEP conducted aerial 
reconnaissance missions in Ogoniland, its experts were able to spot oil 
pollution that could not be detected from the ground.124 The story may 
have been different if UNEP did not have the expertise and resources 
to conduct aerial reconnaissance missions. Also, it was not until UNEP 
employed aerial observations via helicopter in Ogoniland that it 
discovered the “extensive damage to the mangroves in the Ogoni study 
area and it was clear that the geographical extent was so wide that a 
combination of approaches would be needed to assess the overall 
condition of mangroves.”125 It was these observations—which were 
captured and preserved through the means of aerial photography with 
the aid of high-resolution satellite images—that revealed the damage 
to both water edges and landward areas.126 
In addition to the above, the defendants have the resources to hire 
the best legal minds to defend their cases, while the plaintiffs are left 
to struggle to raise a legal team within their means.127 The defendants’ 
lawyers can exploit the technicalities in the law to delay the matter in 
court hoping that the plaintiffs will tire out and run out of steam, and 
the defendants have a seemingly endless source of money to fund the 
process.128 
I argue that the expertise and resources needed are well beyond the 
reach of an average plaintiff in Nigeria. These are some of the hurdles 
the plaintiffs face. On the strength of these arguments and UNEP’s 
firsthand experiences in Ogoniland, it has become imperative for the 
burden of proof to shift from the plaintiffs to the defendants. 
 
121 KAYODE OYENDE, OIL POLLUTION LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 246 (2017) 
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B. The Nature of Evidence 
Environmental litigation covers perhaps one of the most contested 
issues plaguing the world at the moment and, to add to this, there is the 
issue of lack of unanimity from experts in these areas. For instance, 
some segments of the scientific community have dismissed climate 
change as a hoax. Therefore, to stand any chance in environmental 
litigation, evidence must be as watertight as possible. 
In Ogiale v. Shell,129 the plaintiffs lost partly because they could not 
furnish the court with the requisite scientific evidence to discharge their 
burden of proof with the court, reducing the totality of the evidence of 
their witnesses to sheer “ocular inspection and comparism [sic].”130 The 
plaintiffs’ problem is further compounded, generally, where the 
possibility of more than one cause of injury exists.131 The plaintiffs 
must prove the particular cause of their own injuries and establish a 
causal link to the defendant’s actions.132 
This problem is exacerbated as the plaintiffs are equally expected to 
prove special damages—each on their own terms.133 In the case of Shell 
v. Otoko, where the plaintiffs sued Shell and claimed damages for an 
oil spill, the court refused to give judgment to the plaintiffs on the 
grounds that, among other reasons, the plaintiffs were not able to prove 
the various special damages that they claimed, notwithstanding the fact 
that the plaintiffs had called experts as witnesses.134 The court noted 
that plaintiffs’ fifth witness, who was an expert valuer, did not have the 
requisite expertise to make his opinion on the chemical composition of 
oil and its effect on nets relevant and reliable for the court.135 
Commenting on the case, Frynas is of the view that for satisfactory 
proof of all special damages claimed, the plaintiffs would have needed 
separate experts in juju worship, chemical engineering, land 
management, and agriculture, and that the financial cost of hiring and 
funding the experts would have been astronomical.136 
 
129 Frynas, supra note 77, at 130. 
130 Id. (quoting Ogiale v. Shell [1997] 1 NWLR 148, 182 (Nigeria)). 
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132 Id. 
133 See Osipitan, supra note 65, at 121. Special damages are damages an individual has 
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In the case of Ikpede v. Shell,137 the court held that the damages were 
special damages and must be strictly proved.138 Caroline Forster, using 
the difficult-to-obtain evidence in the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal as the basis, admits that, on this score, there is the need to 
revisit the burden of proof usually placed on the plaintiffs and suggests 
that the standard of proof needs to be lowered.139 I am, however, of the 
view that lowering the burden may introduce a degree of subjectivity 
into environmental litigation that makes rational assessment of 
evidence impossible. The way out may well lie in shifting the burden 
of proof from the plaintiffs to the defendants, as the defendant has the 
resources—finances, equipment, contacts, reach, and expertise—to 
gather evidence. This will not only preserve the objective burden of 
proof benchmark; it will guarantee the fairness preached by Forster. 
C. Defendants’ Control and Custody of Evidence 
Another reason why the burden of proof should shift is that evidence 
is almost always either in the custody of or at the disposal of  
the defendants. Therefore, the ease with which the defendants can 
gather these pieces of evidence compared to the plaintiffs can reduce 
the logistical and financial hurdles to their procurement. On this, 
Forster advocates an adjustment to the rule of evidence to “help ensure 
fairness . . . where important evidence lies only in the hands of one of 
the parties, or where a difficult negative proposition may require 
proving.”140 
Sometimes evidence does not even exist to the knowledge or benefit 
of the plaintiffs. In Ogoniland for instance, UNEP confesses that “there 
may still be contaminated areas in Ogoniland about which there is 
currently no intelligence available to UNEP on which to base further 
surveys.”141 UNEP also found that there is no record of air quality in 
Nigeria.142 Furthermore, UNEP discovered that there was no record of 
agricultural productivity, species, area of existence, or any data in 
relation to forest trees.143 Where evidence does exist, it is manifestly  
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unreliable and cannot satisfy the threshold of admissibility, let alone 
stand the crucible of cross examination. For instance, in Ogoniland, 
UNEP found that there was neither “useful, recent [or] robust 
information covering Ogoniland,” nor any “reliable data about the 
quantity of oil spilled in the region.”144 Consequently, UNEP had  
to presume some baseline information from general scientific 
knowledge established elsewhere and extrapolate assumptions from 
those established baseline conditions.145 Even with this technique, 
considering that no two natural phenomena can ever truly be the same, 
we may never know exactly how much damage has been done to the 
region. 
There are even cases where defendants willfully destroy evidence to 
conceal their culpability in environmental degradation. And it makes 
no sense to require plaintiffs to discharge the burden of proof in such 
cases. Halliburton destroyed information regarding its role in the Gulf 
of Mexico’s oil spill for which the U.S. Department of Justice slammed 
its heaviest fine conceivable on the company.146 Camporesi opines that 
companies are as secretive as they can be about information, and that it 
is not uncommon for them to either withhold relevant information or 
create misleading information to hamper the regulatory agency’s 
ability to take regulatory action.147 
The concealment of information by defendants is acute in 
transboundary disposal of waste in developing countries.148 For 
instance, in 1988, Karin B, a ship originating from Italy, emptied 8000 
drums of toxic waste in Nigeria.149 Previously, in 1987, two Italian 
businessmen, Gianfranco Raffaeli and Renato Pent, had approached 
their Nigerian counterpart—Sunday Nana—with a proposal that, for a 
monthly fee of $100, the latter would warehouse 18,000 drums of 
dangerous waste to be shipped from Italy, which the latter accepted.150 
Consequently, toxic waste was shipped from Italy to Koko in the Niger-
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Delta, Nigeria.151 Although the operation was spotted and the waste 
was eventually evacuated and returned to Italy, the effect had already 
set in.152 Kumar would describe this effect as unprecedented: according 
to him, “We have never seen deaths like that before. Lots of our 
children are sick.”153 
The furor that this incident generated became the catalyst for the 
negotiation and subsequent creation of the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, which regulates international shipment of hazardous 
waste.154 But Tony Puthucherril is of the view that the Basel 
Convention actually legitimized trade in hazardous waste—
capitalizing on the precarious economic situation in developing 
countries to engage in trade of waste.155 There is merit in this argument, 
as evidenced by subsequent events, culminating in the negotiation of 
the Bamako Convention by African countries, which places an outright 
ban on dumping of hazardous wastes in Africa.156 Despite these efforts, 
the dumping of waste is still very much a problem today. For instance, 
in 2006, a ship, owned and operated by Trafigura, a British Company, 
after a failed attempt to dispose of its toxic cargo in the Netherlands, 
was finally able to discharge the waste in Côte d’Ivoire.157 When this 
came to light, Trafigura agreed to settle the matter with the Ivorian 
government and agreed to the sum of $198 million for the cost of clean-
up.158 Thirty-one thousand Ivoirians who suffered the harmful effect of 
the waste proceeded against the company in the U.K., but, as usual, the 
company denied liability and chose to blame an independent contractor 
for the illegal dumping of waste.159 It also promised to sue media 
houses who were sympathetic toward the claimants, but this threat did 
not deter The Guardian from releasing emails that exposed Trafigura’s 
efforts to cover up its complicity in illegal dumping. After this 
exposure, Trafigura quickly settled the matter for £30 million.160 
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Further evidence revealed Trafigura’s underhanded dealings 
throughout the entire affair, including its attempt to undermine 
regulations on disposing of hazardous waste by not disclosing that the 
waste was toxic. For these actions, criminal proceedings against 
Trafigura were commenced in the Netherlands.161 The captain of the 
ship and other employees were not spared, as they were also criminally 
prosecuted for their complicities and convicted of concealment and 
forgery.162 In addition, the company was fined €1 million for its role in 
the incident.163 
If such concealments can happen, or even be conceivable in the 
Netherlands—a developed country with stringent laws and meticulous 
law enforcement—one can begin to imagine what happens in 
developing countries. 
Shipping companies are in the habit of concealing the toxicity of 
their cargo from various national authorities in an effort to dispose of 
them without detection. An example is the incident involving a ship 
named “Khian Sea.” In 1986, twenty-eight million pounds of waste 
incinerator ash were shipped by the Khian Sea from Philadelphia to the 
Bahamas, but the ship was not allowed to berth.164 The ship then tried 
its luck in six other countries with no success, as the deadly cargo was 
roundly rejected.165 Unfortunately, Haiti was not that lucky. In 1988, 
about three thousand tons of the waste were dumped in the country 
before the ship was spotted and chased away.166 The ship then 
attempted to dump the rest of its cargo in five different destinations but 
was turned away at every stop. Finally, it was able to empty the waste 
into the Indian Ocean after the ship had changed its name twice, first 
to Felicia and later to Pelacano, to move undetected.167 To further 
conceal the ship’s true identity, the ship’s ownership and registration 
were also changed twice, from Liberia to the Bahamas, and then from 
the Bahamas to Honduras.168 This was not a one-off operation but a 
carefully scripted plan to turn developing countries into dumping  
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grounds for waste rejected by the First World.169 I am of the view that 
asking the plaintiff in these scenarios to discharge the burden of proof 
amounts to putting them through hardships in addition to the harsh 
conditions already foisted on them by the spills and degradation of their 
environments and livelihoods. 
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, a group of Costa Rican farmers 
(plaintiffs) sued Dow Chemical Company (defendant) in Texas, 
alleging that the defendant’s production and distribution of  
1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane pesticide (DBCP) had caused them to 
become infertile.170 The defendant was aware that the U.S. EPA had 
banned the use of DBCP in the United States as a result of its 
“reproductive toxicity,” yet the company was still producing the 
chemical for export to foreign markets.171 Even though the company 
was adamant in its denial of the claim, the company reached an out of 
court settlement to the tune of $20 million with the plaintiffs before the 
suit could proceed to trial.172 Percival remarked that litigation like this 
“illustrates both the power and shortcomings of transnational tort 
litigation.”173 
This tactic of concealment is also employed in the Niger-Delta. As 
such, it was not a surprise when UNEP discovered in Ogoniland that 
ten of the fifteen sites that Shell had insisted were completely 
remediated were in fact still heavily polluted at levels exceeding both 
Shell’s and the government’s benchmark. Unfortunately, the pollution 
from eight of the sites had percolated into groundwater sources and 
contaminated them.174 In the above scenarios, it would not be fair to 
expect the plaintiffs to gather evidence to prove these facts, evidence 
which is not only within the knowledge of defendants but also in their 
possession. 
In addition, there is evidence that these companies were trying to use 
unnecessary technicalities of the law and procedures against litigants. 
The case of Wiwa v. Shell175 highlights some of the tactics often 
employed against the litigants, who are no match for these behemoths. 
In that case, the plaintiff sued Shell for its complicity in the killing of 
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Saro-Wiwa and eight others, among other claims.176 The case dragged 
on for thirteen years on preliminaries, and when the coast was finally 
clear to proceed to trial, Shell suddenly agreed for an out of court 
settlement on the condition that it would not admit liability. The case 
was eventually settled with Shell paying $15.5 million to the 
plaintiffs.177 Considering the state of poverty that ravages the Niger-
Delta, how many plaintiffs can afford to stay in court for thirteen years 
fighting over preliminaries? 
Another tactic employed by the defendants is to dispute the amount 
of spill released into the Niger-Delta environment, which has a bearing 
on the litigation process. In 2008, oil from Shell’s facility spilled into 
35 villages in Bodo, Rivers State, affecting 49,000 inhabitants.178 
Amnesty International, an international watchdog for human rights, 
reported that about 240,000 barrels were spilled.179 Shell admitted to 
spilling only 4,000 barrels and disputed the rest.180 A U.S. company 
estimated the volume between 103,000 to 311,000 barrels.181 Shell’s 
stance hinged on the understanding that without an agreement on the 
volume of the spill, the amount of compensation (which is a matter of 
evidence) cannot be determined by the court.182 Throughout the 
litigation period, Shell refused to clean up the community—even 
several years after the occurrence of the spill—claiming that “the legal 
dispute is hampering its efforts to clean up the oil pollution.”183 Shell 
was further irked that the plaintiffs went to the U.K. to commence legal 
proceedings instead of Nigeria where “there is an established practice 
under Nigerian law to settle such claims.”184 Over the course of the 
trial, Shell eventually admitted an awareness of the poor state of the oil 
pipelines in the Bodo community from which the oil spilled. Shell also 
admitted that their estimates on the amount of oil spilled were incorrect 
and admitted their misjudgment regarding the total volume of oil 
spilled.185 The matter was later settled out of court with Shell paying 
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compensation amounting to $84 million to the plaintiffs.186 Senewo 
argues that the out of court settlement is an admission of liability by 
Shell of its misconduct that degraded the Niger-Delta environment.187 
Shell’s effrontery stemmed from the fact that the Nigerian government 
and courts pander to the International Oil Corporations and treat them 
with kid gloves.188 Oyende terms this unnecessary judicial deferment 
“paternalistic judicial attitude.”189 
What this indicates is that a multifaceted solution is needed to tackle 
environmental degradation. A litigation-based solution can become an 
option, but only when the onus shifts to the culprit instead of the poor 
victims. Otherwise, asking the plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof 
instead of the defendants is akin to giving the defendants a pat on the 
back for their role in degrading the environment. Shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendants may serve as a deterrent against these 
underhanded dealings that are destroying the environment. 
D. The Problem of Proving a Causal Link 
Causation has been described by Dunec as “a chief battleground in 
toxic tort cases.”190 To prove causation, the plaintiffs have to satisfy 
two conditions—that the act of the defendants caused environmental 
damage and that this environmental damage has resulted in injury to 
the plaintiffs.191 This is a significant burden and can be insurmountable 
in some cases,192 especially when it involves concepts about which 
there is limited knowledge. For instance, how do plaintiffs prove 
causation with respect to climate change?193 Harlow and Spencer opine 
that apart from scientists, only a handful of people “even begin to 
understand how complex earth’s climate is and consequently how 
difficult it is to prove . . . what causes long term changes in our climate, 
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let alone that climate change is the cause of a specific weather event or 
series of events.”194 
Perhaps one scenario that vividly captures the complexity of 
resolving causation in environmental litigation is the now famous 
“Kishon Affairs.”195 In 2000, members of the elite arm of the Israeli 
navy stirred the hornet’s nest with their allegation that there was a 
causal link between the cancer they suffered and the severely polluted 
Kishon River where they conducted training during their active 
services.196 But the Israeli Ministry of Defense disputed this claim, 
opining that there was no causal link between the cancer and the 
training in the river.197 At the time of this conflict, the Kishon River 
was heavily polluted by fertilizers and pesticides from the richly 
cultivated Jezreel Valley, and it also served as the receptor of effluents 
from refineries, petrochemical industries, and shipyards.198 In the 
1970s, a report from public health officials indicated that the Kishon 
River had been so gravely contaminated with industrial wastes that all 
signs of life were eradicated.199 Another report from the Balasha-Jalon 
Infrastructure Systems “strongly warned against any direct human 
contact with its water.”200 
To resolve the controversy, a three-man military commission was 
empaneled to find out if there were toxins in the Kishon River; if there 
were toxins present, whether the toxins posed any health risk to people 
who undertook training in the river; whether there was a nexus between 
the surging cancer cases and the river; and whether the military was 
liable.201 After almost three years of intensive work, the commission 
submitted its report.202 The report was itself as controversial as the 
surrounding circumstances as science and law followed different paths. 
While two scientists came to the conclusion that there was no proof 
“that the pollution in the Kishon River caused a statistically-significant 
increase of cancer among the divers,”203 the chairman of the 
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commission came to a minority decision by acknowledging that other 
surrounding pieces of evidence demonstrated that there was a causal 
link between the constant training in the river and contracting cancer.204 
In arriving at this conclusion, the chairman had not required the 
complainants to prove the legal burden.205 Relying on precedents, the 
chairman demonstrated that even in civil tort, where the defendant 
acted in an obviously tortious manner but the plaintiff had no means of 
identifying the specific cause of injury, courts would ease the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof by passing some of it on to the defendant.206 In reality, 
the report did not only reveal the conflict between science and law in 
addressing growing concerns with toxic exposure but it also presented 
“a unified consensual solution to the twin-questions of causation and 
responsibility.”207 Surprisingly, the military sided with the minority 
report, which it adopted and implemented wholeheartedly.208 
In contrast, Nigerian courts have left the onerous burden on the 
already burdened plaintiff. In the case of Shell v. Otoko,209 the plaintiffs 
instituted the suit against Shell, claiming damage for oil spills from the 
defendant’s facility.210 As part of the evidence, the plaintiffs submitted 
a report of the sediment and water samples to prove their case, but the 
court declined to give them judgment on the grounds, among others, 
that the plaintiffs could not prove causation.211 In Ogiale v. Shell,212 the 
plaintiffs lost on the grounds, among others, that they could not “prove 
the causation between oil operations and reduced soil fertility,”213 
despite calling experts in the fields of soil science and agronomy as 
witnesses. The court held that “it is often not entirely clear whether soil 
degradation is the result of oil operations or other factors such as 
intensive farming.”214 
The plaintiffs’ plight is further exacerbated where there are multiple 
sources of pollution and the plaintiffs are expected to prove with 
specificity which of the defendants caused the pollution.215 Osipitan 
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argues that it is unfair to ask the plaintiffs to discharge the burden of 
proof in this circumstance.216 
Even though Harlow credits science as the custodian of knowledge 
in these areas, he also admits that there are situations where science is 
ill-equipped to prove the causal link between the defendants’ actions 
and the plaintiffs’ injury.217 He opines that “[t]wo scientists can 
examine the same data and come to [conflicting and contradictory] 
conclusions about what the data mean in terms of cause and effect.”218 
Lynda Collins blames the difficulty of proving causation on the scarcity 
of data about the safety of industrial chemicals.219 As a result, a 
scientific or legal standard of proof is often unattainable when trying to 
prove cause of illness or death.220 She concludes that this not only leads 
to a miscarriage of justice but encourages the defendants to continue 
their assault on the environment.221 According to Collins, “When 
scientific uncertainty precludes a finding of liability, the result is under-
deterrence of chemical wrongdoing and ongoing violations of human 
rights.”222 
On this basis, I argue that the burden of proof ought to shift to the 
defendants instead of the plaintiffs. The evidence sought is in the 
knowledge and custody of defendants who have both the resources and 
the experts to conduct scientific tests. The difficulty of establishing 
scientific facts in a legal setting makes the establishment of a causal 
link the subject of a negative burden. Once the plaintiff establishes 
harm that is linked to some activity of the defendant, it should be up to 
the defendant to extricate himself from liability by establishing that his 
activity or omission did not cause the harm complained about or any 
harm to the plaintiff. 
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IV 
NIGERIA MUST ALIGN ITS LAW WITH THE CURRENT TREND  
OF SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF FROM THE PLAINTIFF  
TO THE DEFENDANT 
The world is gradually moving away from the standard of the 
plaintiffs bearing the burden of proof in environmental litigation, and I 
argue that Nigeria should do the same by reversing the burden of proof 
from plaintiffs to the defendants. At the international level, Camporesi 
and Knuckles trace this shift to both Principle 15 of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, 1992 (Rio Declaration) 
and Principle 3 of Lisbon Principles of Sustainable Governance, 1997 
(the Lisbon Principles).223 Principle 3 of the Lisbon Principles provides 
that, in the face of uncertainty about environmental impacts, “[t]he 
burden of proof should shift to those whose activities potentially 
damage the environment.”224 
Within national boundaries and jurisdictions, the United States has 
taken the gauntlet. In its food industry, there has been a shift of 
responsibility from the regulator to the industry players who are now 
required to prove that each imported item is safe and conforms to the 
FDA’s standards.225 This approach has also been extended to the 
chemical industry where the regulator—the EPA—now requires that 
chemical companies prove the safety of their chemicals, rather than 
requiring the regulator to test each chemical for safety or otherwise.226 
In Israel, as shown in the Kishon River case above, the courts have 
developed a body of precedents in which the burden of proof is on the 
defendants in injurious claims involving military personnel.227 The 
only duty placed on the plaintiffs by the courts is to establish a probable 
nexus between the injury and duty. As soon as the plaintiffs are able to 
do this, the burden of proof then shifts to the military to rebut.228 This 
attitude is extended to all tortious liability cases.229 
Ecuador has taken the notch higher by constitutionalizing the shift 
in the burden of proof from the plaintiffs to the defendants in Section 
397(1) of the 2008 Constitution by providing that, in issues of  
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environmental sustainability, “[t]he burden of proof regarding the 
absence of potential or real danger shall lie with the operator of the 
activity or the defendant.”230 Also, courts and regulators are mandated 
to resolve uncertainties by interpreting environmental laws in favor of 
the environment.231 Constitutional requirements have preeminence 
over other legislation. Given the rigorous process required to amend 
the constitution, constitutionalizing this shift guarantees that any 
changes to the provision will receive widespread attention and 
deliberations from all sectors of the society. In this regard, 
constitutionalizing trumps nonconstitutional legislative processes and 
guarantees progress, acting as a bulwark against rollbacks and 
regressions.232 Nigeria should aim to meet global benchmarks by 
establishing these constitutional strongholds for environmental 
protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The need for the burden of proof to shift in environmental litigation 
in Nigeria has become an imperative. As shown in the UNEP Report 
and also argued by Camporesi and Knuckles, in the extractive industry, 
“where the very activities that drive profit can cause environmental 
harm, only the private sector has the capacity, information, and 
resources necessary to conduct adequate testing required to prove that 
their actions are not causing environmental damage.”233 
Furthermore, these potential defendant companies employ 
underhanded tactics to deceive regulators and potential plaintiffs  
as they deliberately withhold, obfuscate, and create misleading 
information. Sometimes, the defendants are in collusion with the 
regulators who may be more interested in immediate financial gains 
either for private individuals, the regulatory agency, or the nation. It is 
only fair that defendants are made to show that their conduct is 
justified. 
Additionally, proving causation can be difficult as nothing can be 
guaranteed in the realm of science where yesterday’s food has become 
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today’s poison. This happens because scientific theories are validated 
based on standards that combine their ability to explain phenomena and 
some subjective conformity to the scientist’s worldview, so that future 
experimentation can totally overturn previously validated scientific 
theories.234 The complexity of environmental systems with myriads of 
forces, processes, and interactions dramatically escalates these 
uncertainties and difficulties.235 For this reason, Harlow opines that it 
is difficult for plaintiffs to successfully discharge the burden of proof 
in environmental litigation.236 Golan adds, “The courts’ insistence on 
concrete proof and the difficulties for science to deliver it turned 
causation into a central problem for the thriving late-modern genus of 
toxic tort litigation.”237 Examining evidence generally and not from the 
causative point of view, Frynas argues that in Nigerian environmental 
litigation, a major challenge is how to gather credible evidence to prove 
one’s case.238 Frynas identifies the difficulty in getting scientific 
evidence to be admitted by the court as a problem, and concludes that 
as plaintiffs usually bear the burden of proof in all litigation in 
Nigeria—and providing the scientific evidence needed to establish 
plaintiffs’ claims is easier for the oil companies—it remains an arduous 
task for the local people.239 This situation informed Osipitan’s 
observation that from his experience as a Professor of Law and a Senior 
Advocate of Nigeria, the plaintiffs rarely discharge the burden of proof 
in environmental litigation. 
Besides, the defendants already have a wide range of legal defenses 
which operate in their favor: statutes of limitation, several procedural 
rules on misjoinder of parties, and causes of action.240 Apart from these 
legal defenses, defendant oil companies have more financial and 
technical resources at their disposal than their opposing penurious, 
rural litigants.241 Thus, they are better positioned to provide superior 
expertise in court. There is, therefore, a significant challenge to 
plaintiffs’ access to justice in lawsuits against oil companies.242 
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Confronted with these realities, Oyende argues that the success in 
Nigerian courts involves overcoming many difficult obstacles.243 
On the above premises, I conclude that it has become imperative for 
the burden of proof to shift from the plaintiffs to the defendants in 
environmental litigation in Nigeria. This will not only be fair to the 
plaintiffs who bear the brunt of environmental degradation, it will also 
position Nigeria’s law in line with modern-day reality. 
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